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Spector and Kitsuse’s ‘Radical’ Theory of Social 
Problems, Forty Years On
Joseph Schneider
Malcolm Spector and John I. Kitsuse called their constructionist social problems theory “radical” 
relative to what had been offered before in the sociolog y of social problems. In this brief essay I argue 
that the radical ideas of their Constructing Social Problems remain, in many ways and some forty years 
later, still quite radical next to most of what is written in sociolog y under the banner “social problems.” 
Reconsidering those radical elements is the aim here, making clear just what that claim summarizes as 
both the excitement the theory still offers us and, at the same time, the grounds for it being resisted by 
most professional sociologists.
That I and others, including Malcolm Spector himself, are today still writing 
and talking with colleagues about the “constructionist approach” to the study 
of social problems is gratifying if not remarkable. It’s not that a more than 
forty-year sustained interest in an academic theory is unusual, of course, but 
perhaps it is notable that some of its earliest authors are still alive and part 
of these discussions. More importantly, the arguments written in the mid-
1970s by Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse (2001) in their Constructing Social 
Problems remain, to borrow one of their concepts, “viable,” which is to say 
alive among professional sociologists. Beyond the biographical relevance of 
this work to the academic careers of early contributors, this viability is marked 
by the 2017 session at the annual meetings of The Society for the Study of 
Social Problems in Montreal, which drew together both long-time and new 
adherents and interested others (Michael Adorjan, Joel Best, Jim Holstein, 
Peter Ibarra, Donileen Loseke, Dorothy Pawluch, Malcolm Spector, and my-
self; with Stephen Pfohl in the audience). There are plans for a special issue of 
or section of papers in the American Sociological Association’s journal, The 
American Sociologist as a result of the Montreal session. And this present collec-
tion of papers in Società Mutamento Politica gives further evidence of the ongoing 
interest in Spector and Kitsuse’s ideas. Finally, the economic viability of the 
constructionist approach to social problems is apparent in that their book is 
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still in print. John Kitsuse, who, sadly, is no longer part of these exchanges, 
would, I am sure, smile his usual modest and bemused approval. 
I
My aim here is to consider briefly a few so-called “radical” elements of Spec-
tor and Kitsuse’s argument on social problems theory that I think contribute 
to its longevity as still provocative scholarship within sociology (see Holstein 
and Miller 1993; Holstein and Gubrium 2008) and to its ongoing relevance 
as a critical strategy for claims-making as political action in public life. All of 
these elements marked the difference of their theory on social problems from 
those that had come before. Those perspectives provided the points of depar-
ture for their argument and critique. In this, there are obvious parallels to 
elements central to the labeling perspective in the study of deviance that also 
have made that argument still central to sociological research and thought, 
more than half a century after Howard Becker (1963) and John Kitsuse (1962) 
wrote some of its signature texts.1 
II
Central in the constructionist argument Spector and Kitsuse made is the 
seemingly simple point that Spector makes again in the interview published 
in this issue: “Social problems are what people think they are.” What made 
their book and its argument so important is that they insisted on taking that 
point seriously, in and of itself, as a guide to the development of an academic 
and scholarly tradition of sociological research and writing. No sociologists 
writing on social problems had done that before. That remains its guiding 
and still valuable insight (Schneider 2018).
Spector and Kitsuse of course were not the first to argue that how people 
define something constitutes—dynamically and in process—what they take it 
to be and how they might act toward it. Such an insight is at the heart of the 
symbolic interactionist tradition, from which Becker’s, Kitsuse’s, and Spector’s 
scholarship and teaching variously emerged. But the genius of their argument 
1 Although these two authors both drew on core elements of  the symbolic interactionist tradi-
tion, Kitsuse referenced Lemert’s (1967) “deviance as societal reaction” argument while Becker 
reflected the influence of  Everett Hughes’ (1971) attention to collective processes, subcutures, 
and “careers” in his writing on occupations.
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is to insist on what they themselves then called a “radical” position, elements 
of which might have meant something somewhat different even between the 
two authors. I think it is the very “radical” qualities of their argument that 
contribute to the still-lively scholarly conversation around their work. 
Their critical review of the earlier sociological writing they called the 
“value conflict” perspective made it clear that the very insight they wished to 
foreground—that claims, definitions, and action organized by those claims 
and used by “claims-makers,” in and of themselves, bring “social problems” 
into existence—should be the guide to inquiry. If social problems are what 
people think they are, then what people “think,” and, more importantly for 
an empirically-based social science, how such thinking is, arguably, seeable in 
what they do—in “action”—should be the guide to inquiry. In short, claims-
making or “definitional activities” constitute social problems as moral activ-
ity, just as, if too simply put, “labeling” brings into view the moral marking 
that the concept “deviance” announces.2 
They had to insist on this point, given what they had seen in that prior 
work, which, ostensibly, also took the idea seriously that social problems are 
what people think they are. And it of course was not that those writing this 
prior work tried or intended to write internally contradictory or theoretically 
muddled arguments. Rather, either through an ill-conceived commitment to a 
“commonsense” or a “knowledge” shaped by the givens of their own sociolog-
ical training—and no matter their professed agreement with the definitional 
tenet—they found it essentially impossible to insist on it as the constitutive 
feature of “social problems” as a scholarly topic worthy of theory and empiri-
cal research in its own right. As Spector here notes, Kitsuse and he could see 
the difficulty in maintaining this focus in Becker’s early writing on deviance 
(e.g., the misstep of the “secret deviant” [Pollner 1974]). Even the founder of 
the labeling argument—who did not make it a point to call his view “radical” 
and who reports that he had no sense of “founding” anything—missed seeing 
how counter-intuitive his claims about the “secret deviant” were/are; and per-
haps especially so for sociologists—and the ease with which a preference for 
the familiar normative and structural assumptions of the discipline can over-
ride the key constructionist insight thus offered. That Spector and Kitsuse 
themselves would reiterate that misstep even as they set forth their “radical” 
view (i.e., the marijuana example, pointed out by Woolgar and Pawluch 1985, 
216; and see also their comments on tonsils, Spector and Kitsuse 2001, 43-44) 
2 I understand the notion of  “related activities,” relative to claims and definitions, to be those 
that arguably and demonstrably are shaped with and from the meanings that the claims and 
definitions—the words, most simply—used by participants convey. 
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only serves to underscore both the particularity of their argument and offer 
evidence of the ontological weight of conventional sociology itself (that is, its 
proffered view of what the world is, after all, “really like”).3 
What their radical view wanted to hold at bay, of course, was the seeming-
ly obvious reference to “undesirable conditions,” “social context,” or “social 
factors” as both the causes and the essence of social problems. The parallel 
for the labeling argument is Becker’s reference to the notion of “rule break-
ing” and the idea that deviance is, simply, transgression; full stop. But if social 
problems and deviance are to be defined as “what people ‘think’ they are,” 
and if one wants to take that claim seriously toward making social problems 
an academically respectable subfield of sociology, writ inclusively, conditions, 
social context, and rule breaking have to be treated as resources “people” use 
to “say” what they “think” is problematic in their worlds and lives. Those 
terms and ones like them cannot then also be an explanatory resource for 
professional sociology without calling into question what it offers distinct from 
the vision and analysis of claims-makers themselves. This insistence on keep-
ing distinct the agendas and resources of claims-makers, on one hand, and 
the parallel but different resources of those who study them is the ethnometh-
odological insight Kitsuse no doubt brought from his early work with Aaron 
Cicourel (Cicourel and Kitsuse 1963). Such analysis gives “conditions,” “con-
text,” and “rules” to those they called “members”—claims-makers in our au-
thors’ terms—and makes the particular versions of these terms used part of 
the constructionist sociologist’s data. 
The controversy around what some critics chose to call Spector and Kit-
suse’s “strict” constructionist argument as distinct from what they themselves 
named a “contextual” position (e.g., Best 1989, 245-46) blurred this distinction 
and the key point our authors made about social problems as a sociological 
topic. The so-called contextual position always struck me as a revised version 
of the “reasonable compromise” that they had explicitly rejected in earlier 
social problems writing. I do not think Spector and Kitsuse, in taking this 
“radical” stance, were offering a thoroughgoing critique of sociology, which 
seemed to be what some who championed this criticism implied. Rather—
and with notably less congeniality than Becker’s proposal on deviance4--they 
insisted that if we want to treat social problems seriously as an intellectual 
3 Surely, I attest to this same misstep, as noted by Woolgar and Pawluch, in my own work at the 
time, so pointing to Becker and Spector and Kitsuse is here is to emphasize the effort necessary 
to resist the familiar explanatory moves around these topics in the discipline. 
4 Becker, in presenting his argument, stated that it is one way to think of  and see “deviance,” 
but that there are other viable sociological approaches. Spector and Kitsuse refused this com-
promise position on how to study “social problems.” 
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and academic topic, the position of the sociologist as expert participant in 
claims-making, could not be taken up. Spector and Kitsuse did not claim 
that sociologists should give up contextual and structural accounts of, say, 
poverty, violence, rule breaking, undesirable and of course ostensibly “desir-
able conditions” of all sorts. This is clear in the first pages of their book, where 
they distinguish the sociology of the “social problem of organized crime,” on 
the one hand, and the sociological study of “organized crime,” per se, on the 
other (Spector and Kitsuse 2001, 2-5). This insistence is as important today 
as it was when Spector and Kitsuse first wrote their papers and then their 
book in an attempt to consider what a “theory” of social problems might be. 
To compromise here is to erase the essential and still productive contribution 
that they made. 
III
“Putative” is an extraordinary word. Prudence Rains (1975), in an early and 
important paper, suggested it as a “careful” way to talk about deviance as 
understood in the societal reaction perspective of Edwin Lemert (1951), later 
extended by John Kitsuse (1962). Kitsuse had used the notion of “imputa-
tion” in a paper on deviance to underscore the centrality of definition to the 
constitution of deviance. Spector and Kitsuse made “putative” their preferred 
way of referring to “conditions” typically thought central to social problems. 
It is, at least in sociology, another radical move. Rains (1975, 3) notes: “Like 
the term ‘alleged,’ ‘putative’ is intentionally, even ostentatiously, careful talk, 
allowing one to speak of something without commitment to its actuality.” For 
the societal reaction argument, she notes, this word inserted a central ambi-
guity around the question of what deviance as societal reaction is a reaction 
to. Our authors push this word to do work for them beyond securing ambigu-
ity. The OED tells us that putative is: “That [which] is commonly believed to 
be such; reputed, supposed; imagined; postulated, hypothetical.”5 
In the use of this word as an adjective to modify “conditions”—still argu-
ably the favored sociological candidate for cause and/or constitution of “so-
cial problems” (see, e.g., Treviño 2018)—Spector and Kitsuse announce they 
will remain agnostic as to the relevance, even the existence, of these alleged 
phenomena. For some readers, this is not only “going too far,” but is a funda-
5 (http://www.oed.com.cowlesproxy.drake.edu/view/Entry/155203?redirectedFrom=putativ
e#eid). Given this definition, they might initially have pushed this word just a bit farther, saving 
themselves some later efforts at clarification. 
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mental refusal of their obligation as sociologists; as social scientists. And given 
Rains’ use of the word “actuality,” critics might have misread—willfully and 
not—a larger denial of the closely-related term, “reality.” As Bruno Latour 
(1999) makes clear from his experience in the science wars, some skeptics criti-
cal of and/or misunderstanding the presumptions of “construction,” might 
read “putative” as an affront to all foundations of anything called “science,” 
as well as commonsense, with which sociology always must make some work-
able connection. 
Spector and Kitsuse surely were not denying reality in their use of this 
powerful term. Indeed, the need for a more solid reality in their search for 
defensible empirical materials in social problems sociology is one of two bases 
on which they premise their approach. Rather, their use of putative should 
be seen as a quite particular ontological indifference with respect not to what 
exists but to what will be taken, with theoretical warrant, as relevant data. 
It signals that they will not consider the very element that typical sociologi-
cal understandings of social problems had given—and still do give—pride 
of agential and ontological place. This may seem like another version of the 
“ontological gerrymandering” that Woolgar and Pawluch so clearly and im-
portantly detailed. Is this then merely a “selective realism” instead of the “se-
lective relativism” that they had identified in so much published social con-
structionist writing; the same sort of error but in the “other direction”? 
There is I think a simpler and more familiar way to look at it. First, such a 
move is, in effect, precisely what much quantitative and structural sociology 
does in its turn away from the processes of meaning construction typical of 
narrative and discursive analysis or what is sometimes called “interpretive” 
or “qualitative” sociology. This turn, as it is in Spector and Kitsuse’s work, is 
also typically warranted by the theories and methods those sociologies use. A 
critique of inconsistent and contradictory analysis is one thing—to be taken 
seriously, of course—but a theoretically-warranted turn toward what our au-
thors call claims-making or definitional activities is hardly in itself to be re-
jected as illegitimate. 
Second, I direct us back to Woolgar and Pawluch’s (1985, 224) productive 
essay. They offer three possible readings of the charge that their paper’s title 
names: as (1) a “handbook” for how to “do” social problems analysis of this 
sort; (2) a critique of the inconsistencies found in the social problems analyses 
that call themselves “social constructionist” and a request for more care in how 
these studies are done; and (3) an illustration of the inevitable and essential 
dilemmas that all such explanatory argument of this scientific sort faces. They 
here refer to a dilemma that Woolgar (1988, 30-39) later detailed in his writ-
ing on science studies as the “methodological horrors.” There he argues, as he 
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does with Pawluch, that the ontological gerrymandering under examination 
is a dilemma inherent to the sort of explanation common to science and thus 
to the work in question; that it is a dilemma that cannot be solved, but rather 
presents such inquiry with something to be “managed” rather than denied or 
not seen (which was the case, it seems to me, in the social constructionist writ-
ing that the critics considered in their paper). They write: “the inconsistencies 
we identify…are not mere technical difficulties in social problems arguments, 
but pervasive features of all attempts to explain social phenomena” (Woolgar 
and Pawluch 1985, 224). This, arguably, is what Spector and Kitsuse were 
offering in their constructionist theory: a strategy for managing this dilemma 
is their move to agnosticism on “conditions” except as found in the claims 
of members’ constitutive work in making social problems; that is, except as 
members’ claims, as Ibarra and Kitsuse (1993, 30) point out. That more than 
a few authors using Spector and Kitsuse’s argument, myself included, made 
errors in following that theoretical direction (reading 2, above) is not an in-
dictment of the argument itself.
In marking this refusal to address conditions independent of their appear-
ance in members’ claims, they make another bold move. It foregrounds what 
has come to be called the “positionality” of the analyst. In stepping back from 
the uncritical use of the term “condition,” they – to borrow a word from Rains 
– “ostentatiously” distinguish their own stance on the question of what will 
be taken seriously as a resource in their analysis. Some could see this as an 
unseemly level of self-reference or regard, especially for scientists; as an inap-
propriate insertion of or attention to their own action or presence into what 
they are studying. I prefer to see it as a provocative and productive token of 
reflexivity in their analysis, saying, in effect, “we don’t do it that way because, 
as noted, ‘social problems are what people think they are.’ QED!” 
Closely linked to “putative conditions,” our authors offer another provoca-
tion: that it is the “viability” of claims made rather than their validity that 
deserves our attention in the study of social problems (and, indeed, well be-
yond). This insists, yet again, that we take the words, meanings, characteriza-
tions, “quasi-theories” (Hewitt and Hall 1973), and what Pollner (1987) called 
“mundane reason” and related actions by claims-makers seriously as empiri-
cal instances of “what people ‘think’” – about what social problems are. Like 
“putative,” viability directs sociological analysis to search not for whether the 
claim is “true” or accurate – hoping thus to secure for the sociologist of struc-
ture and context a “safe” place to stand as expert – but rather whether and 
how it is sustained across time/space and various claimants. Again, our au-
thors step away not from a realist argument but rather from one that focuses 
on observational matters that their theory writes as irrelevant to their very 
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question: what are social problems in sociology and how might they be studied 
in a more productive and scholarly way?
Both in the refusal to regard conditions as other than definitions – that is, 
as relevant to their analysis only as found in the claims by participants – and 
then keeping the bright light of analysis on those definitions and how they 
are reiterated, challenged, changed, dropped and linked by members to re-
lated actions rather than evaluating them as true or false, our authors pushed 
sociologists to study empirically something central to “morality-in-the-mak-
ing” (cfr. Haraway 1997). They thus draw our attention to what conventional 
concepts of structure and aggregate as explanations of social problems either 
background or leave out of the analysis altogether. 
Making the viability of members’ claims the focus of attention avoids the 
familiar expert move to give epistemological priority to the sociologist’s sci-
entific and ideological claims over against those of the people studied as they 
mark moral aspects of their own lives. Spector and Kitsuse criticize the func-
tionalist theory of social problems foregrounded in an influential textbook by 
Robert Merton and Robert Nesbit (1971) on this matter in their sociological 
claims that presumed to “correct” people about their own moral and ethical 
judgments. While allowing that through certain technical training a sociolo-
gist might claim more accuracy in claims than social problems participants, 
Spector and Kitsuse (2001, 36-37) challenge what they call a “professional 
ideology” apparent in Merton and Nesbit’s functionalist position that imagi-
nes “the sociologist as the conscience and protector of society.” By focusing 
on the viability rather than the truth or accuracy of member claims, Spector 
and Kitsuse refuse the position of moral experts who claim that they “know 
better” than the lay or non-expert citizen about their own moral and ethi-
cal judgments. Again, this is not to suggest that our authors eschew a realist 
ontology and familiar epistemology. It does, however, represent a refusal to 
adopt such an evaluative view on the very question of moral judgment itself. 
If “social problems are what people think they are,” just as, in another homely 
but instructive phrase, “deviance is in the eye of the beholder,” the sociologi-
cal apparatus used to examine these phenomena in the world should not be 
in the business of refusing or denying precisely what “people” think and see.
IV
And while perhaps I cannot today call an insight dating to the 1940s still 
“radical,” one more piece of Spector and Kitsuse’s argument that I’m quite 
sure still “feels” radical to many readers is their use of C. Wright Mills’ (1940) 
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take on values and motives. Long a challenge for sociological analysis, if not 
for all social science, our authors use these familiar terms in a way that reit-
erates their turn to “what people ‘think.’” That is, elaborating Mills’ insight 
evident in his notion of “motive mongering,” values in social problems inquiry 
are marked as linguistic resources that members specifically and explicitly 
deploy in their writing and speaking to characterize themselves, others, situ-
ations, and objects. Rather than technical and explanatory resources, which 
bring their own problems, Spector and Kitsuse (2001, 91-95) treat “values” 
as words or phrases typically used by participants in definitional activity to 
“ground” or ostensibly defend their claims made or to be made, wittingly 
and strategically—or not. The consistency here is apparent both in terms of 
staying focused on what those studied say and do as the “data” for analysis 
and also in a refusal to comment evaluatively on the value language members 
use in their claims. It is both the theoretical consistency that such a move 
enables—we remain within the definitional space of members—and the turn 
away from the vague, circular attempt to portray values as causing behavior, 
that appeals.
V
These various refusals of the conventional position of the social problems soci-
ologist as scientific expert on “undesirable conditions” as well as the arguably 
proto-reflexive stance toward their own work, are at the heart of our authors’ 
contributions to social problems theory. I think this is invited—even if im-
plicitly—in the way they critically examine prior theory and research. If I 
hadn’t seen it clearly before Woolgar and Pawluch’s critique, it became crystal 
clear after: that Spector and Kitsuse’s critical examination of how sociolo-
gists of social problems before them made their arguments might be turned 
deconstructively toward their own theory; if not by them, then by others. As 
Woolgar and Pawluch suggest, and drawing on insights from science studies 
(e.g., Kuhn 2012; Latour and Woolgar 1986; Latour 1999; Haraway 1997), it 
is apparent that our authors are, from ethnomethodology, “members” too, a 
point they explicitly do not deny, even if they do not pursue that question in 
their argument (see Schneider 1993). They invite this in raising the question 
of the location of the sociologist relative to whom and what are studied, a fun-
damentally reflexive move. What I have detailed above is surely part of such 
an examination. It easily goes further to consider our authors’ own profes-
sional claims-making on behalf of their argument, their strategies for manag-
ing the unsolvable tensions inherent in scientific argument itself, as Woolgar 
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and Pawluch productively pointed out (and what scientist does not face these, 
wittingly or not?); and a close and critical reading of texts that draw on their 
theory but are less than careful in its use. Pacé Latour, deconstruction and 
reflexivity need not be destructive, but at the very least, such choices invite a 
strong dose of humility for the experts themselves and offer no guarantees on 
how one’s work will be received, which of course is precisely what all claims-
makers face, witting, professional, and not.
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